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Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for
Corporate Officers (and Other Senior Agents)
By Lyman Johnson*
Countless legal materials address the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. These include
extensive decisional law, numerous institutes and continuing legal education seminars, several
treatises and casebooks, and the well-known Corporate Directors Guidebook recently released
in its fifth edition. By contrast, legal materials on the fiduciary duties of corporate officers-key
actors and agents in any company--are quite sparse. Case law is meager and undeveloped, with
even such a baseline issue as the applicability of the business judgment rule lacking resolution.
Treatises, institutes, and other legal materials frequently lump officer fiduciary duties with those
of directors or treat them as an afterthought or in many instances, overlook the subject altogether.
There is no preeminent, standard reference serving as the "Corporate Officer's Guidebook."
This Article seeks to begin rectifying this glaring gap in legal literature and professional
practice. Fiduciary duties, as a vital component of an effective corporate governance system,
work on an ex ante basis-i.e., officers must be advised of such duties beforehand if such du-
ties are to influence conduct. This Article describes the sources of legal material for deriving
a succinct exposition of officerfiduciary duties and then provides suggested "model"fiduciary
duty advice for lawyers to use in counseling corporate officers and other senior managers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Countless legal materials address the fiduciary duties of corporate directors.
These include extensive decisional law,1 numerous institutes and continuing le-
gal education seminars,2 several treatises and casebooks,3 and the well-known
* Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The author
thanks Frank Balotti, Larry Hamermesh, and David Millon for helpful comments on earlier versions of
this Article. Will Young provided valuable research assistance.
1. The Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery together have, over the years, rendered
hundreds of opinions dealing with the duties of corporate directors. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362, 370 (Del. 2006) (holding that the director's duty of good faith is an element of the director's duty
of loyalty, not an independent fiduciary duty); ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, C.A. No. 489-N,
2006 WL 3783520, at *15-17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (finding that director breached his duty of
loyalty by stripping corporation of its substantial assets for no consideration), aff'd, No. 60, 2007,
2007 WL 1704647 (Del. June 14, 2007) (unpublished table decision).
2. See, e.g., Corporate Board Member, Conferences, http://www.boardmember.com/conferences/ (last
visited Oct. 7, 2007) (listing ten director education programs for the years 2007-2008); Seattle University,
School of Law, Center on Corporations, Law & Society, The Fifth Annual Directors Training Academy:
Adding Value Through Legal, Ethical, and Responsible Corporate Governance, http://www.law.seattleu.
edu/ccls/events/directorstraining/2007/brochure.pdf (publicizing conference held on June 15, 2007).
3. All major corporate law casebooks designed for United States law schools and all major corporate
law treatises contain materials-to varying extents-on director fiduciary duties. See, e.g., 1 R. FRANKLIN
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Corporate Director's Guidebook, recently released in its fifth edition.4 By contrast,
legal materials on the fiduciary duties of corporate officers-key actors and agents
in any company-are quite sparse.' Case law is meager and undeveloped, with
even such a baseline issue as the applicability of the business judgment rule lack-
ing resolution.' Treatises, institutes, and other legal materials frequently lump
officer fiduciary duties with those of directors or treat them as an afterthought
or, in many instances, overlook the subject altogether.' There is no preeminent,
standard reference serving as the "Corporate Officer's Guidebook."
Exacerbating a lack of legal materials, empirical evidence suggests lawyers do
not routinely advise corporate officers as to their fiduciary duties. 8 Whether law-
yer neglect is the cause, or the effect, of the paucity of legal materials is unknown.
Whatever the reason for the oversight, the continuing inattention to officer fidu-
ciary duties, in comparison to the immense attention lavished on the duties of
corporate directors, is striking.
This Article seeks to begin rectifying this glaring gap in legal literature and pro-
fessional practice. Fiduciary duties as a vital component of an effective corporate
governance system work on an ex ante basis-i.e., officers must be advised of
such duties beforehand if such duties are to influence conduct. Officers, more-
over, are unlikely to deliberately adhere to fiduciary duties if lawyers do not first
counsel them as to the essential contours of those duties. And lawyers in turn are
more likely to offer such critical advice if they have dependable and convenient
legal material for doing so.
Part 11 of this Article describes the sources of legal material for deriving a suc-
cinct exposition of officer fiduciary duties. Part III provides suggested "model"
fiduciary duty advice for lawyers to use in counseling corporate officers and man-
agers. Of course, the proposed advice can and should be modified to take account
of various factors noted in Part III. An Appendix reproduces the source material
from which the model advice is drawn.
1I. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR OFFICER FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In thirty-four states there are both statutory and common law sources for officer
fiduciary duties. 9 The remaining sixteen states have only common law The primary
BALOTTI &JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.17 (3d
ed. 2007).
4. COMM. ON CORP. LAws, SECTION OF Bus. LAw, AM. BAR ASS'N, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK (5th ed.
2007).
5. See Lyman EQ. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1597, 1600-01, 1609-10 (2005).
6. Lyman PQ. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. LAw. 439 (2005);
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks, Ill, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule:
A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 Bus. LAw. 865 (2005).
7. Casebooks and treatises pay little, if any, separate attention to the fiduciary duties of corporate
officers. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 5, at 1600 & n.10, 1609-10 (noting how legal materials
generally lump officers and directors together, making no distinctions between them).
8. Lyman PQ. Johnson & Robert V Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties,
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 669-78 (2007).
9. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42 (2005) (listing thirty states with statutes based on the Model
Act). See infra note 16 for a citation to all thirty-four statutes. As noted in footnote 16, two states-Nevada
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common law source is the law of agency-officers being agents' 0 -and the re-
cent Restatement (Third) of Agency ("Restatement") is the most authoritative and
thorough source of agency law principles." To be sure, on certain points the
law of agency in some states may differ from those principles articulated in the
Restatement, especially until courts and lawyers become more familiar with-and
accordingly have occasion to help shape the law to reflect-some of the doctrinal
innovations of the Restatement. In the area of the fiduciary duties of agents, how-
ever, that is unlikely to be the case, inasmuch as core doctrinal precepts appear to
enjoy wide acceptance. Of course, given the paucity of case law directly address-
ing the fiduciary duties of corporate officers, it remains possible that courts, for
various policy rationales thought persuasive for senior executives, may temper the
way in which traditional agency principles are applied to such persons. Conceptu-
ally, however, officers are agents and, absent convincing case law guidance to the
contrary, lawyers should counsel them as such. Those sections of the Restatement
most pertinent to officer fiduciary duties are set forth verbatim in Appendix 1.
In thirty-two of the thirty-four states that have codified officer fiduciary
duties, their statutory source derives from section 8.42 of the Model Business
Corporation Act, a copy of which is set forth in Appendix 2.12 Section 8.42,
captioned "Standards of Conduct for Officers," was first adopted in 1984.11 It
and New York-have statutory standards of conduct for officers but those statutes are not based on the
Model Act. Moreover, the statutes of South Dakota and West Virginia appear to be based on the Model
Act but for some reason (perhaps oversight) the Annotated Model Act does not list the statutes of those
two states.
10. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 5; Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the Duty of Candor:
Do the CEO and CFO Have a Duty To Inform?, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 269 (2006).
Although this Article specifically addresses corporate officers, the agency principles drawn on in
fashioning advice for officers about their fiduciary duties can apply more broadly in the business
organization area. They are pertinent to unincorporated associations, such as in advising managers of
limited liability companies and partners of partnerships, inasmuch as those persons are agents, sub-
ject, of course, to what the applicable business entity statute and operating agreement or partnership
agreement specify on the subject of fiduciary duties. Unless no fiduciary duties whatsoever are owed-
see infra note 33 for recent scholarship exploring policy concerns about such an extreme arrangement-
managers and partners also should be advised of their duties by the business's lawyer, in the same
essential manner (if not with the same substantive content) as thisArticle advocates for corporate officers.
11. RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF AGENCY (2006). Those sections of the Restatement most relevant to agent
duties are reproduced in Appendix 1. The Reporter for the Restatement, Professor Deborah DeMott,
has written articles on agency principles subsequent to her drafting of the Restatement. See Deborah
A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955 (2005); Deborah A. DeMott,
Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and Consequences of Executives' Duties, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 251
(2006); Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REv. 1049 (2007).
12. See Appendix 2 & supra note 16. Delaware, the leading corporate law state, has no general
statutory standards of conduct for officers or directors. However, Delaware does have a statute deal-
ing with conflict of interest transactions between a corporation and any of its officers or directors.
DEL. CODE tLit. 8, § 144 (2007) (citations to the Delaware Code are to the official online version at
http://www.delcode.delaware.gov/ (last accessed Sept. 27, 2007)). Also, to be eligible for indemni-
fication by the corporation, an officer must have acted "in good faith and in a manner the person
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation." DEL CODE tit.
8, § 145(a), (b) (2007). This Article does not specifically address corporate statutes dealing with con-
flict of interest transactions involving, or indemnification statutes covering, corporate officers. Such
statutes do require certain specified conduct of officers. Adherence to the model advice set forth in
Part Ill substantially enhances the likelihood that officers will meet the required standard of conduct
prescribed in those sorts of statutes.
13. See MobEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (2005).
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was most recently amended in 2005 to add the current subsection (b),' 4 which
imposes a disclosure obligation on officers in certain far-ranging situations.
The latest version has not been adopted by any state,' 5 but earlier versions
have been adopted, either verbatim or with some variation, in thirty-two
states. 16
States deviating from later versions of section 8.42 of the Model Act have done
so in a variety of ways. For example, Minnesota and North Dakota continue to re-
quire that officers act with the care of an "ordinarily prudent person"1I-the origi-
nal, possibly stricter, standard of care language from 1984.18 Also, Georgia has
omitted the Model Act requirement that an officer act in what he or she reasonably
believes to be the corporation's best interests and also has deleted subsection (c),
which permits an officer to rely on various persons.' 9 Other states have altered
the standard in yet additional ways.2" Consequently, the statutory standard for the
specific state in which the company is incorporated must be carefully examined.
The statutory standards of conduct and the Restatement differ in how they formu-
late officer duties. First, unlike section 8.42,21 the Restatement does not expressly
impose on agents a duty to act in good faith except when seeking a principal's
consent to, and when acting in conjunction with, a conflict of interest transaction.
Second, section 8.42 contains an explicit right to rely on others 22 including other
14. Comm. on Corp. Laws, Section of Bus. Law, Am. Bar Ass'n, Changes in the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act-Amendments Relating to Chapters 1, 7, 8 and 14, 60 Bus. LAw. 943, 951 (2005).
15. The statement in the text is based on a survey of statutes which were in effect as of August 1,
2007.
16. ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.42 (1999); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.06.483(e), (f) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-842 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-842 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-108-401, 402 (2007);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-765 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-842 (2003); HAw. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 414-233 (LexisNexis 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-842 (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.842
(West 1999 & Supp. 2007); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-420 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:91 (1994 & Supp. 2007); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 843 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 156B,
§ 65 (2004); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 450.1541(a) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. § 302A.361 (2006); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.42 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-443 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2099
(1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:8.42 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-8-42 (West 2005); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-60 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.377 (2005); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1712(c),
1732(c) (West 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-420 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 47-1A-842 (2007)
(citation to the South Dakota Code is to the official online version at http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/
StatutesQuickFind.aspx (last accessed Sept. 27, 2007)); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-18-403, 48-18-601
(2002); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.42 (2007) (citation to the Texas Business Corporation Act is to the
official online version at http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/ba.toc.htm (last accessed Sept. 27, 2007));
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-840 (2005); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.420 (West 1994); W VA. CODE
ANN. § 31D-8-842 (LexisNexis 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-842 (2007).
Nevada and New York also have statutory standards of conduct for officers that differ from the
Model Act. The Nevada statute essentially requires only that the officer act in good faith and "with
a view to the interests of the corporation." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138 (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp.
2005). The New York statute requires good faith and the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
use. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 715(h) (Consol. 2003).
17. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.361 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-60 (2005). New York, although
not a Model Act state, also imposes this requirement. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 715(h) (Consol. 2003).
18. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 8.42 (1984).
19. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-842 (2003), with MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (2005).
20. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42 (2005).
21. See Appendix 2, MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 8.42 (2005).
22. See id.
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employees, unlike the Restatement, probably because the latter addresses agents
generally, not just corporate officers. Moreover, officers under the Restatement are
likely to have an implicit right to rely, at least in certain situations, as part of their
duties of care and competence.
2 3
Third, neither section 8.42 itself nor the Official Comment to that section
ever uses the term "fiduciary" to describe officer duties, whereas the Restate-
ment states explicitly that an agent's duty of loyalty is a "fiduciary duty."
2 4
Interestingly, however, the Restatement describes the agent's duties of care,
competence, and diligence as "performance" duties ,25 deliberately avoiding
the descriptor of "fiduciary," while noting, however, that other sources do re-
fer to such duties as fiduciary in nature. 26 Also, the Restatement establishes as
the standard applicable to the duties of care, competence, and diligence that
level of conduct "normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances. "27
Section 8.42, however, specifies only a standard of care, without using the terms
"competence" or "diligence," and establishes as the applicable standard "the
care that a person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar
circumstances." 28
Finally, the Restatement states that a "general or broad" advance release of an
agent from the agent's "general fiduciary obligation to the principal [i.e., the duty
of loyalty] is not likely to be enforceable." 29 As to the duties of care, competence,
and diligence, however, the Restatement states that a "contract may, in appropriate
circumstances, raise or lower the standard" applicable to those duties and that
such duties can be "contractually shaped," but it does not indicate whether they
can be eliminated altogether. 30 By way of contrast, the Official Comment to Model
Act section 8.42 states that an officer's disclosure obligations may not be negated
by agreement but their scope under subsection (b)(1) "may be shaped."3 The
issue of how far employment agreements may go in limiting the fiduciary duties
of officers or in reducing (eliminating?) officers' monetary liability for breach, or
both, is likely to receive significant attention in the years ahead as lawyers increas-
ingly appreciate the current open-ended nature of officer liability This issue of
the degree to which fiduciary duties are "mandatory," rather than being subject
23. See Appendix 1, RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006).
24. See id. § 8.01. Model Business Corporation Act § 8.42, modeled on the director standard of con-
duct found in Model Act § 8.30, is probably essentially a duty of care provision. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. § 8.30 cmt. (2005) ("This standard of conduct is often characterized as a duty of care.").
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006); id. § 8.08(b) reporter's note b.
26. See id. § 8.08(b) reporter's note b. Although the term "prudence" is less widely used today than
in years past, the duty of care included, historically, the obligation of"prudence." See supra notes 17-18
and accompanying text. Prudence is an ancient moral virtue involving deliberation and judgment
that, when exercised on behalf of another, would seem to be "fiduciary" in character. See Joseph E
Johnston, Jr., Natural Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Business Managers, in BUSINESS AND RELIGION: A
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? 279, 289-90 (Nicholas Capaldi ed., 2005).
27. See Appendix 1, RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006).
28. See Appendix 2, MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (2005).
29. See RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 cmt. b (2006).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 cmt. b (2006).
31. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42 cmt. (2005).
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to contractual change, will undoubtedly arise in the corporate setting, just as it
already has arisen, albeit in somewhat different form, in the unincorporated busi-
ness entity setting.
33
Due to these and other possible differences in formulation, the exact inter-
relationship between the requirements of the Restatement and section 8.42 is not
completely clear, 34 though each source is mindful of the other. The Comment to
section 8.08 of the Restatement expressly refers to section 8.42 as establishing
standards of conduct for corporate officers. 35 And the Official Comment to Model
Act section 8.42 explicitly cites the Restatement (Second) of Agency on an agent's
duties of obedience, loyalty, and care, and suggests that such agency principles
govern the conduct of corporate employees and officers.3 6 For purposes of coun-
seling officers ex ante, it is probably best to regard the duties specified in both
section 8.42 (as modified in certain states) and the Restatement as fully applicable,
without worrying about identified differences or possible overlap between these
two sources. Consequently, as part of a preventive risk reduction strategy, the
generic advice formulated in Part III draws on both sources as wholly applicable
to corporate officers.37 It bears emphasizing as well that the fiduciary duties de-
scribed below pertain to any lawyer serving as a corporate officer by, for example,
holding the position of "Chief Legal Officer."
III. MODEL FIDUCIARY DUTY ADVICE FOR OFFICERS
Corporate activity today is heavily regulated. Securities, environmental, an-
titrust, employment, and criminal laws-to mention just a few-all bear on
a company's business affairs. Consequently, corporate officers may need to
32. Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers Under
Delaware Law, 44 AM- Bus. L.J. 475 (2007) (arguing for limits on the ability of officers to alter their
fiduciary duties contractually).
33. Several recent articles thoroughly describe and analyze the policy concerns of broadly permit-
ting a contractual "opt-out" of fiduciary duties in the unincorporated business association context.
Carter G_ Bishop, A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business Organization Law, 41 TuLSA L.
REv. 477 (2006); Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TuLsA L. REv.
451 (2006); Robert W Hillman, Closely-Held Firms and the Common Law of Fiduciary Duty: What
Explains the Enduring Qualities of a Punctilio, 41 TuLSA L. REv. 441 (2006); Mark J. Loewenstein, Fidu-
ciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In Defense of the "Manifestly Unreasonable" Standard, 41
TuLsA L. REv. 411 (2006).
Contractual opt-outs of fiduciary duties are problematic enough when a person (such as a stock-
holder) acts in his or her own behalf to permit a fiduciary (such as a director) to be (somewhat) free
of fiduciary constraints. It is more problematic yet when a person who is a fiduciary (e.g., a corporate
director) acts on behalf of a party to whom he or she owes fiduciary duties, to permit yet another
fiduciary (e.g., a corporate officer) to be (somewhat) free of fiduciary duties. See Johnson & Millon,
supra note 5, at 1641. Thus, it may be more problematic to carve back an agent's duties in the latter
setting than in the former.
34. Johnson & Millon, supra note 5, at 1631-34.
35. See RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 cmt. b (2006).
36. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42 cmt. (2005).
37. The proposed advice is based on the latest (2005) version of section 8.42. Although that ver-
sion has yet to be adopted by any state, the disclosure obligations it imposes on a company's officers
are sound and serve the company's interests. Moreover, section 8.11 of the Restatement mandates
disclosure in certain instances as well, although it is probably narrower in scope than the latest version
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be advised as to how a host of regulatory regimes might affect a company's
operations. Many of these matters are, or should be, addressed in a company's
well-drawn code of conduct or code of ethics.3 8 But the fiduciary duties im-
posed on corporate officers by state law overarch all officer functions-they
are broadly-worded standards, not narrow rules, and they are pervasive and
unremitting in reach.
39
For this reason, officers should be regularly advised as to their fiduciary du-
ties. This is best done when (or shortly after) they are first hired and periodically
thereafter. They should also be reminded of those duties at the outset of sig-
nificant events, such as, for example, when engaging in acquisitions, divestitures,
substantial financings, or financial restructurings, and when contemplating major
contracts or projects of any kind.
It is a daunting interpersonal challenge for a lawyer to provide fiduciary duty
advice at appropriate times and in a suitable manner, while avoiding the appear-
ance of being a legal "scold." Especially for in-house counsel-who likely regard
themselves as business managers and "team players" as well as lawyers-this can
involve some awkwardness. At the same time, to discharge their own legal and
professional obligations4 0-which are owed to the company, not the officers-
lawyers must effectively communicate to officers the essential contours of their
fiduciary obligations.
What follows is intended to be a useful resource for corporate lawyers and law
professors. It is not meant to be a verbatim script or formula to be uncritically
adopted. It is, rather, meant to be more of a template, one effort to succinctly but
fully convey the essential gist of officer duties. The prose style is deliberately a
bit more conversational in tone, while also maintaining an inevitable seriousness.
It will, of course, require tailoring to reflect possible state law differences noted
above, as well as the lawyer's own communication style and relationship to the
particular officer being advised, and to best meet the client company's specific
circumstances and unique needs. The advice might also be modified somewhat
to take account of differing functional responsibilities or levels of seniority by,
for example, using illustrations suitable for particular groups or persons but not
others.
Without question, the advice could simply be written up and delivered to cor-
porate officers, possibly as a key part of the company's code of conduct. At least
of section 8.42. See Appendix 1, RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006). The duty of a trustee to
provide information also is an important related subject today See Thomas P Gallanis, The Trustees Duty
to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1595 (2007).
38. Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a public company to disclose whether it has
adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers and to disclose in public filings if its code of eth-
ics changes or if any waivers from the code are granted by the company. Sarbanes-Oxtey Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406, 116 Stat. 745, 789-90 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (Supp. V 2005)). It
is now customary for public companies to include a wide range of matters in their codes of ethics and
to make them applicable to a significant number, if not all, of their employees.
39. Cf. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (describing director duties as "unremitting").
40. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 8, at 681-84 & nn. 87-105 (describing professional responsibility
of lawyers to advise officers).
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at the hiring stage, and perhaps occasionally thereafter, however, the advice may
carry greater weight if delivered in person, as frequently is done when advising di-
rectors. Perhaps, for example, this could be done, initially, as part of an orientation
session and, later, at a periodic "update" event. It should also be made very clear
that the lawyer giving the advice represents the company, not the individual of-
ficer. It is worth underscoring yet again that the advice set forth below applies to
those lawyers who themselves serve as corporate officers. One aspect of this is
seen in the obligation of all officers-including legal counsel-to use their special
skills and knowledge to carry out their responsibilities. Such skills and knowledge
are likely to be taken into account in determining whether an officer has acted
with appropriate care and diligence.
" As an officer of [Company X1, you are a fiduciary. This means you owe a
legal duty to act loyally for the company's benefit. When carrying out your
responsibilities, you must always seek to advance what you reasonably be-
lieve to be the company's best interests, and you must place the company's
well-being above your own personal interests or those of anyone else.
" You also owe the company a duty to always act in good faith. This means
you should act with an honest purpose. It also means you must not delib-
erately disregard your responsibilities and that you must not intentionally
violate any laws.
" You are not to ask for or receive any significant benefits from any third
party in connection with actions you take on behalf of the company, in-
cluding gifts or business opportunities, unless you obtain approval from
the board of directors. This is true even if you think doing so will not harm
the company. While employed by the company, you must never act on
behalf of someone doing business, or proposing to do business, with the
company.
" You may not compete with the company in any of its business endeavors
or assist any of its competitors unless you obtain approval from the board
of directors. You must not use the company's property for your own or
anyone else's purposes. You must not use or communicate the company's
confidential information for your own purposes or those of anyone else.
" You must not enter into a business transaction with the company unless
you obtain approval from the board of directors. If you wish to propose
such a transaction, or if any relative or business or professional affiliate of
yours wishes to do so, you must contact [specify] before taking any actions
involving the company on such a proposal.
" In addition to owing the company a duty of loyalty and good faith, you
also owe a duty to act with due care, competence, and diligence. You
must always act with the care that is reasonable for someone in your po-
sition under similar circumstances. You must use your special skills and
knowledge in carrying out your responsibilities. You must follow lawful
instructions or other direction you receive from the board or from an of-
ficer senior to you to whom you report.
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" It is important for you to know that you must report certain matters to
others in the company This includes any business information within
your sphere of responsibility that you know, or have reason to believe, to
be either significant to the person to whom you report or that that person
would wish to have, so that he or she can effectively perform his or her
job. 41 It also includes any information you have concerning actual or prob-
able material violations of law, or breach of duty by any employee or agent
of the company, that you believe has already occurred or is about to occur.
Any such past or imminent violation of law or duty should be immediately
reported to [specify]. Information, or a violation of law or duty, can be sig-
nificant or material either because of the dollar amount involved or because
of its serious nature.
" Perhaps the best way to recall your fiduciary duties in a shorthand fashion
is simply to remember that you owe a duty of loyalty to act in the best
interests of the company and a duty of reasonable care when acting on its
behalf.
" If you have any questions about what I said, or if any question ever arises
in your mind as to what these duties entail, please contact me [or specify]
and we can speak further.
There are several reasons why lawyers should advise corporate officers as to
their fiduciary duties.42 Only three will be briefly mentioned here. First, in the
years ahead it is quite likely that the conduct of corporate officers will be judicially
evaluated more frequently for adherence to applicable fiduciary duties. 43 For the
good of the company's and the officer's own interests, officers should be made
aware of the basic thrust of their duties before they act, not simply upon being
sued. In short, it is an integral part of an officer's legal and cultural "literacy" to
more clearly understand what his or her fiduciary obligations encompass. Second,
the author believes that persons who, in strong language, are told by a respected
figure, such as legal counsel, that they owe a special responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of others are more likely to refrain from negative conduct,
and engage in positive conduct, than are people who believe they can solely ad-
vance their own interests. To advise someone that he or she must be "loyal" to
the interests of the larger enterprise in carefully discharging his or her business
responsibilities is likely to lead the listener both to consciously desire to act at a
higher level and, possibly, actually to perform at a higher level.
The absence of such moral-sounding language, by way of contrast, may lead
an actor (such as an officer) to believe that he or she largely may (and perhaps
should) act out of self-interested motives. The inaction of lawyers on this matter
41. Note that the reporting obligation under section 8.11 of the Restatement is formulated some-
what differently than the obligation under section 8.42 of the Model Act. The proposed advice com-
bines the two formulations.
42. For a discussion of these reasons, see Johnson & Ricca, supra note 8, at 681-91.
43. In 2004, Delaware amended its jurisdictional statute to assert jurisdiction over officers who are
not also directors. See DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2007).
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may itself be sending a negative signal to officers and thereby reinforcing an un-
healthy norm of self-interest.
Moreover, by advising officers of their fiduciary duties the lawyer is not telling
the officer what to do. Rather, when lawyers clearly and regularly impart to of-
ficers that they owe duties of care and loyalty, these social-legal norms will help
officers reflectively assess, and possibly alter, their own conduct. This is not a
substitute for the lawyer, in appropriate settings, bringing to bear his or her own
judgment as to the propriety of a transaction or course of conduct. It does, how-
ever, supplement the view of the lawyer and avoids unhealthy client efforts to
wholly shift responsibility to the lawyer to legally "pass" on or "bless" the matter.
Officers are made aware that with respect to any and all aspects of their conduct
they must always satisfy themselves that they have fully discharged their fiduciary
duties to the company
Third, a conversation between company counsel and a new officer about fidu-
ciary duties-and other matters as well-can put a human face on legal advice
while also serving to habituate officers to consult lawyers at the very outset of sig-
nificant matters. This enhances the ability of lawyers to work with business manag-
ers to prevent problems and reduce company risk, to the good of all concerned.
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APPENDIX 1
[Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006)]
Chapter 8
DUTIES OF AGENT AND PRINCIPAL TO EACH OTHER
TOPIC 1. AGENT'S DUTIES TO PRINCIPAL
TITLE A. GENERAL FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE
§ 8.01 General Fiduciary Principle
An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all mat-
ters connected with the agency relationship.
TITLE B. DUTIES OF LOYALTY
§ 8.02 Material Benefit Arising Out of Position
An agent has a duty not to acquire a material benefit from a third party in
connection with transactions conducted or other actions taken on behalf of the
principal or otherwise through the agent's use of the agent's position.
§ 8.03 Acting as or on Behalf of an Adverse Party
An agent has a duty not to deal with the principal as or on behalf of an adverse
party in a transaction connected with the agency relationship.
§ 8.04 Competition
Throughout the duration of an agency relationship, an agent has a duty to
refrain from competing with the principal and from taking action on behalf of or
otherwise assisting the principal's competitors. During that time, an agent may
take action, not otherwise wrongful, to prepare for competition following termi-
nation of the agency relationship.
§ 8.05 Use of Principal's Property; Use of Confidential Information
An agent has a duty
(1) not to use property of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those
of a third party; and
(2) not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for
the agent's own purposes or those of a third party
§ 8.06 Principal's Consent
(1) Conduct by an agent that would otherwise constitute a breach of duty as
stated in §§ 8.01, 8.02, 8.03, 8.04, and 8.05 does not constitute a breach
of duty if the principal consents to the conduct, provided that
(a) in obtaining the principal's consent, the agent
(i) acts in good faith,
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(ii) discloses all material facts that the agent knows, has
reason to know, or should know would reasonably af-
fect the principal's judgment unless the principal has
manifested that such facts are already known by the
principal or that the principal does not wish to know
them, and
(iii) otherwise deals fairly with the principal; and
(b) the principal's consent concerns either a specific act or transac-
tion, or acts or transactions of a specified type that could reason-
ably be expected to occur in the ordinary course of the agency
relationship.
(2) An agent who acts for more than one principal in a transaction between
or among them has a duty
(a) to deal in good faith with each principal,
(b) to disclose to each principal
(i) the fact that the agent acts for the other principal or
principals, and
(ii) all other facts that the agent knows, has reason to know,
or should know would reasonably affect the principal's
judgment unless the principal has manifested that
such facts are already known by the principal or that
the principal does not wish to know them, and
(c) otherwise to deal fairly with each principal.
TITLE C. DUTIES OF PERFORMANCE
§ 8.07 Duty Created by Contract
An agent has a duty to act in accordance with the express and implied terms of
any contract between the agent and the principal.
§ 8.08 Duties of Care, Competence, and Diligence
Subject to any agreement with the principal, an agent has a duty to the princi-
pal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents
in similar circumstances. Special skills or knowledge possessed by an agent are
circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the agent acted
with due care and diligence. If an agent claims to possess special skills or knowl-
edge, the agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and
diligence normally exercised by agents with such skills or knowledge.
§ 8.09 Duty to Act Only Within Scope of Actual Authority and to Comply
with Principal's Lawful Instructions
(1) An agent has a duty to take action only within the scope of the agent's
actual authority
(2) An agent has a duty to comply with all lawful instructions received from
the principal and persons designated by the principal concerning the
agent's actions on behalf of the principal.
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§ 8.10 Duty of Good Conduct
An agent has a duty, within the scope of the agency relationship, to act reasonably
and to refrain from conduct that is likely to damage the principal's enterprise.
§ 8.11 Duty to Provide Information
An agent has a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts
that the agent knows, has reason to know, or should know when
(1) subject to any manifestation by the principal, the agent knows or has
reason to know that the principal would wish to have the facts or the
facts are material to the agent's duties to the principal; and
(2) the facts can be provided to the principal without violating a superior
duty owed by the agent to another person.
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APPENDIX 2
[Model Business Corporation Act § 8.42 (2005)]
§ 8.42 Standards of Conduct for Officers
(a) An officer, when performing in such capacity, has the duty to act:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best in-
terests of the corporation.
(b) The duty of an officer includes the obligation:
(1) to inform the superior officer to whom, or the board of direc-
tors or the committee thereof to which, the officer reports of
information about the affairs of the corporation known to the
officer, within the scope of the officer's functions, and known
to the officer to be material to such superior officer, board or
committee; and
(2) to inform his or her superior officer, or another appropriate
person within the corporation, or the board of directors, or a
committee thereof, of any actual or probable material violation
of law involving the corporation or material breach of duty to
the corporation by an officer, employee, or agent of the cor-
poration, that the officer believes has occurred or is likely to
occur.
(c) In discharging his or her duties, an officer who does not have knowledge
that makes reliance unwarranted is entitled to rely on:
(1) the performance of properly delegated responsibilities by one or
more employees of the corporation whom the officer reasonably
believes to be reliable and competent in performing the respon-
sibilities delegated; or
(2) information, opinions, reports or statements, including finan-
cial statements and other financial data, prepared or presented
by one or more employees of the corporation whom the of-
ficer reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the
matters presented or by legal counsel, public accountants, or
other persons retained by the corporation as to matters in-
volving skills or expertise the officer reasonably believes are
matters (i) within the particular person's professional or expert
competence or (ii) as to which the particular person merits
confidence.
(d) An officer shall not be liable to the corporation or its shareholders for
any decision to take or not to take action, or any failure to take any
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action, as an officer, if the duties of the office are performed in com-
pliance with this section. Whether an officer who does not comply
with this section shall have liability will depend in such instance on
applicable law, including those principles of section 8.31 that have
relevance.
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